CADs are a new form of defence cooperation. In essence, these agreements create a long-term institutional framework for routine bilateral defence relations, including defence policy coordination, joint military exercises, working groups and committees, training and education exchanges, defence-related research and development, and public procurement. As a master plan, the CADs reserve specific details of the implementation of the protocols and the modalities of implementation. This flexibility means that CADs can both enhance traditional defense capabilities and tackle non-traditional protein threats such as terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and cybersecurity. It is important that CADs do not contain mutual obligations in defence or non-attack. They are not alliances. And unlike the forms of defense cooperation that dominated great power politics during the Cold War, they are typically very symmetrical and mutually commit to a common set of guidelines. Third, I do placebo-type tests, and I like the UAE model on two samples: dyads that have signed at least one DCA and dyads that have not signed a DCA. Footnote 116 Not only does this specification test H3, but also consider the possibility that temporal influences excluded despite controls may be correlated with network influences. Let us take the example of a state that, over time, improves in military quality. Inspired by the logic of common benefits, this improvement should make this state a more attractive DCA partner.
If military quality is correlated with degree centrality or links to third parties, but is omitted from the model, parameter estimates may be biased. However, any time-varying influence on common benefits should be as influential on subsequent agreements as on a first agreement, as there is no plausible reason for countries interested in powerful, prosperous, similar or otherwise strategically valuable partners to suddenly lose interest as soon as a first agreement is signed. Therefore, if the network influences on such excluded time variables are false, we would observe, contrary to expectations, that their effects do not differ between the placebo group and the treatment group. On the other hand, if the network influences are derived, as is suspected, from information mechanisms, they should be significantly different in terms of size between the two groups. In combination with FEs, this specification is therefore a powerful tool to improve causal infetence. Historically, States have tried to reassure partners in this way. In 1997, Romania declared that it would “increase its chances of rapidly joining NATO by developing a new partnership with Hungary” and made it clear that Hungary`s willingness to sign an agreement would convince Hungary`s partners – NATO member countries – of Romania`s intentions for cooperation. Footnote 93 The Estonian Minister of Defense similarly described a DCA with Turkey as a way to “show good relations with all members of the [NATO] Alliance,” in the hope that Turkey`s agreement would lead to the approval of Turkish partners. Footnote 94 And in 1998, Ukraine signed a major DCA with Argentina, in part to convince Argentina`s defense partners, particularly the United States, of Ukraine`s interest in cooperating with the West. Footnote 95 Figures 6 and 7 say little about the mechanisms. . .